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ABSTRACT: Cloud storage service allows users to store their data online, so that they can remotely access, 
maintain, manage, and back up data from anywhere via the Internet. Although helpful, this storage creates a 
challenge to digital forensic investigators and practitioners in collecting, identifying, acquiring, and preserving 
evidential data. This study proposes an investigation scheme for analyzing data remnants and determining probative 
artifacts in a cloud environment. Using pCloud as a case study, this research collected the data remnants available on 
end-user device storage following the storing, uploading, and accessing of data in the cloud storage. Data remnants 
are collected from several sources, including client software files, directory listing, prefetch, registry, network PCAP, 
browser, and memory and link files. Results demonstrate that the collected remnants data is beneficial in determining 
a sufficient number of artifacts about the investigated cyber crime. 
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Cloud computing provides businesses and individuals different types of computer services. Organizations rely on 
cloud computing resources to replace large in-house computing systems, such as servers and data centers, to increase 
service accessibility and availability. These resources enable users to upload their data to servers, allowing them to 
access and share data with other users at any time. 
Businesses can use computing services without high deployment costs through cloud computing. The high 
scalability of infrastructure resources provide businesses and IT organizations with increased opportunities for 
developing high-end, low-cost computing services. Pay-as-you-go models reduce computing costs. Businesses and 
organizations are provided many choices in cloud service providers to weigh advantages against possible drawbacks. 
These include losing control of personal computing resources, applications, and data storage. 
Several studies and surveys have reported that cloud computing is subject to exploitation by malicious users 
despite the rapid advancement of cloud computing services. Loss of control over stored data is a security challenge in 
cloud computing. The authors in (1) concluded that the location of data storage in the cloud and the multi-tenancy of 
customers on cloud servers are security concerns. Forensic practitioners also face challenges from cloud technology 
because data can be accessed by malicious users using web browsers and portable devices without leaving traceable 
evidence. Dropbox™, iCloud, Mega, Tresorit, Copy, and Box are examples of cloud service providers that require 
further investigation. 
Cloud computing means the use of a network of remote servers and data centers hosted on the Internet in 
different locations to store, manage, and process raw data. Cloud computing provide users with shared processing 
resources for computers and other devices connected to the network. Cloud storage service market has grown 
significantly (2). Forensic hand means the use of scientific tests or techniques for crime detection (3). Cloud 
forensics is a cross-discipline between cloud computing and digital forensics. 
Cloud storage and its advancement bring advantages to computer users that are subject to misuse by irresponsible 
users and criminals, such as cases of criminals using cloud storage to store and exchange illegal material and to 
commit botnet attacks. The investigation process for extracting and collecting cybercrime evidence in cloud storage 
is tedious and challenging due to the increased complexity of each case. The seizure and evidence retrieval process 
for cloud digital forensics have encountered legal issues. Network World stated that businesses that use cloud 
computing should clarify with cloud storage providers their responsibility of providing forensic evidence in criminal 
incidents, such as cyber attacks or data breaches (4). 
Users of public cloud services must cooperate with cloud service providers to obtain digital evidence because 
normal forensic investigators cannot obtain evidence from cloud service providers without proper warrants issued by 
a jury. Cloud service providers must carry out the evidence collection process on behalf of the requester to acquire 
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digital evidence. The forensic practitioners involved must ensure the authenticity and reliability of the evidence 
collected (5). They have difficulty gaining access to physical hardware to locate files and evidence because all data 
are stored in different data centers and computers worldwide. Data centers may not belong to the same entity or be 
located in the same country. Reference (6) stated that cloud systems and services give computer forensic 
practitioners difficulty in obtaining and analyzing digital evidence from traditional server-based systems due to such 
difficulty. 
Having a proactive methodology is important to carry out digital forensic investigations that are sufficiently 
flexible to work with future providers of new cloud storage services (7). Forensics investigators must also have 
information regarding the location and type of data remnants left by cloud users from the devices they used to access 
cloud services (8). Forensic investigators must ensure that all digital evidence is acceptable and understandable by 
jurisdiction personnel that do not have IT backgrounds. 
The present study reviews current challenges in cloud forensics and proposes a proactive scheme to improve the 
processes of locating and collecting cybercrime artifacts in cloud computing. This study investigates existing digital 
evidence collection methodologies using the data remnants left on user devices prior to the use of cloud storage 
applications. These data remnants are then used for new cloud storage development. Many online cloud storage 
services have been introduced to fulfill different customer demands. TABLE 1 provides a summary of some cloud 
storage providers.  
 
TABLE 1 − Summary of cloud service providers 
Feature Dropbox Google Drive Microsoft OneDrive pCloud 
Size of free 
storage 
2 GB 15 GB 5 GB 10 GB 
Security 
Client encrypted 
files, geo-redundant 
storage, and folder 
permission 
Data stored 
encrypted in 
128-bit AES 
Encryption at rest is 
available on 
OneDrive for 
business users 
Uses TLS/SSL encryption, 
applied when information is 
transferred from a device to the 
iCloud servers 
File 
Versioning 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Area of 
specialization 
Compatibility with 
other services 
Data syncing 
between 
devices 
Collaboration with 
Microsoft Office 365  
Valuable files are accessible 
even offline 
File size 
restriction 
10 GB with 
websites only 
5 TB 10 GB Unlimited 
OS supported 
Windows OS, Mac 
OSX, Linux OS, 
Android, iOS, 
BlackBerry, and 
Kindle Fire 
Windows OS, 
Mac OSX, 
Android 
platform, and 
iOS 
Windows OS, Mac 
OSX, Android 
platform, iOS, and 
Windows Phone 
Windows OS, Mac OSX, 
Android platform, iOS, and 
Linux 
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Related Work 
 
Section II reviews articles related to this study and discusses research findings, methodologies, limitations, and 
conclusions for each article. Quick and Choo conducted a study to determine ways to acquire files uploaded and 
accessed using Dropbox (7). A standard personal computer with a virtual machine (VM) was installed with the 
Windows 7 operating system; this was used to examine different cases using various PCs, as well as in the forensic 
analysis of Dropbox client software in different browsers. The browsers included Microsoft Internet Explorer®, 
Google Chrome™, and Mozilla Firefox®. This study determined the data remnants and artifacts left on a Windows 7 
hard drive after using Dropbox. These data remnants include usernames, passwords, browsers, software access, data 
stored in accounts, and timeframes found on file metadata. Data from the Enron corpus was used to test accounts 
created with three service providers. MD5 values were created. VMs were made using VMware® Player 4.0.1. A 
VM for each service provider was used for testing, and Base-VM files were utilized as control media to discover 
newly created files after each scenario. 
The network traffic generated by each scenario was observed using Wireshark. The timestamps of the original 
files were recorded, and the original files were hashed. Several files were uploaded from the Dropbox application, 
and copies of each browser were created and labeled. A similar process was completed when accessing and 
downloading files from created Dropbox accounts. All associated files from the Dropbox accounts were moved to 
the VM desktops as a zipped files. The zip files were extracted to the desktop, opened, and closed. The stored data 
was erased using the US Department of Defense 5220.22-M setting, which only deletes data after they are 
overwritten thrice (9). 
The VMDK files of the VMs from the hard drive, along with each VMEM file and network capture file (PCAP), 
were identified for each VM for data identification. FTK imagers were used to capture data memory, and the 
remaining VMs were analyzed. The forensic copies were preserved and analyzed according to standard procedures. 
Eraser and CCleaner software erased the files on the cloud. The Dropbox application keeps a record of devices 
synchronized to an account. A timestamp of activities, such as the installation, uploading, downloading, and 
uninstalling of certain files and applications through Dropbox, was found. The hash values of each file remained 
unchanged. Thus, the data in the files were unaltered. The timestamps were manipulated by each service. Directory 
listing was produced using AccessData FTK Imager 3.1.0. Encase software was used to retrieve file names. The 
remaining files showed the Dropbox usage. Eraser or CCleaner software failed to completely clean the remaining 
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data on the use of Dropbox. Data concerning the previous presence of Enron or Dropbox sample files were 
completely removed.  
Quick and Choo reported that several providers should be included in future research to determine whether files 
stored on their servers remain unchanged. Table 2 shows the contributions and limitations of their study. Dykstra and 
Sherman concentrated on the integrity of forensic data downloaded from Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) 
servers (10). They investigated the accuracy of forensic toolkits in acquiring forensic data from cloud storage 
environments through the Internet. The study also expanded its research to live forensic acquisition using forensics 
tools, such as Fastdump from HBGary, Memoryze from Mandiant, and FTK Imager from AccessData. The 
percentage of success of the evidence collection process, the duration, and trust required was evaluated. 
 
TABLE 2 - Contribution and limitation of Quick and Choo’s research 
Contributions Limitations 
Verified how to obtain the files uploaded and stored in 
Dropbox 
Timestamps were manipulated by each service. 
Revealed the data that remain on a Windows 7 PC using a 
Dropbox application. This includes the usernames, 
passwords, browsers, software access, remaining data 
stored in the accounts, and the timeframe found on file 
metadata 
Only Dropbox was used in the case study, and the 
results cannot be proven to be the same for different 
service providers. 
  
EC2 is an infrastructure-as-a-service solution, where clients have direct control over the establishment and 
usage of the VMs installed in a host server that enables forensic investigators to create a forensic image of the entire 
VM by uploading FTK or EnCase onto the VM. The created forensic images were examined using traditional 
forensic acquisition techniques. The manner in which remote forensic agent VM introspections were injected to 
remote acquisition was demonstrated. 
Data from an EC2 VM were acquired using several techniques, such as using VMs to create forensic images. 
EnCase Enterprise or AccessData FTK was used to analyze the produced images. Other techniques include the use of 
Amazon Web Services to export data. Amazon exports requested data on an external drive and maintained a chain of 
custody. Amazon sends drives directly to the requestor along with a report of the exported data (10). 
The study found that the files delivered to the requestor from Amazon have the same MD5 values as the 
original files. Therefore, the cloud data were not altered by the data acquisition process. Future studies were 
suggested to cover the request submission to Apple to export iCloud data to a physical drive for the requester. The 
data should be further analyzed to identify whether the metadata were altered from the initially uploaded files. 
TABLE 3 shows the contributions and limitations of Dykstra and Sherman’s research. 
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TABLE 3 − Contribution and limitation of Dykstra and Sherman’s research  
Contributions  Limitations  
Examined the forensic integrity of data downloaded 
from EC2 servers 
This research is only applicable to EC2 servers. The results 
cannot be proven to be same using different service 
providers. 
Investigated the ability and accuracy of forensic 
toolkits in the data acquisition process 
Amazon exports the files to a physical hard drive that is 
sent to the requestor. This process may delay 
investigations. 
 
Chung et al. (2012) conducted a study that focused on the data stored on servers (11). Chung stated that the 
difficulty in finding user activities upon service subscription is the most difficult aspect of investigating a cloud 
storage service (6). Information of user activities may be founded in the log files of a cloud server. However, most 
cloud companies are unwilling to release this information to protect the personal information and privacy of their 
clients. The study aimed to find traces left on PCs that access Amazon S3, Dropbox, Google Docs, and Evernote for 
cloud storage. The study also proposed a process for the forensic investigation of cloud storage services and 
described important elements of the investigation process. 
Internet Explorer and Firefox were used to access clouds services in order to locate the data left in temporary 
logs files. Traces of system installation log and database files are left in the registry when installing an application on 
a Windows system. These files are vital because they contain traces of cloud storage service usage. Forensic 
investigators can obtain original documents and related metadata from the client device given that some cloud 
services sync the files stored on the cloud server with the computer’s hard drive of the client.  
The study included some constraints because it failed to compare MD5 values at each phase to show file 
integrity. The study’s methods should be used as reference for cryptographic hashes to ensure that the files are 
identical. TABLE 4 shows the contribution and limitations by Chung et al.. Oestreicher (2014) also conducted a 
study that focused on data acquisition methods on iCloud (12) that locate iCloud-synched files in the operating 
system. The differences between the file acquisition process and the original files were used to identify hash value 
similarities and metadata to ensure file integrity for court presentation. 
TABLE 4 − Contribution and limitation of Chung et al.’s research 
Contributions Limitations 
Found files retained in PCs and smartphones after accessing 
cloud services from Amazon S3, Dropbox, Google Docs, and 
Evernote 
The research did not compare MD5 values at 
each phase to show file integrity. 
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Proposed a process model for the forensic investigation of cloud 
storage services and described important elements of an 
investigation 
The proposed model for the forensic 
investigation of cloud storage services should 
be further investigated using other providers 
of cloud storage service. 
 
Two identical VMs were used to conduct the study: a subject computer and an examination computer. These 
VMs were clean and installed using Mac OS X 10.9. Various screenshots were taken at different stages to determine 
the location of artifacts formed by the iCloud service and to compare the subject and examination computers. 
A new iCloud account was created on the subject machine, and the data was synced with iCloud. The second VM 
performed live data acquisition once synchronized with the newly created iCloud account. Data from file acquisition 
were analyzed to locate specific iCloud artifacts. The files were downloaded and compared with the hash value. The 
results showed that the data downloaded from iCloud were forensically sound. The similarity of the hashing value 
and the timestamps of the required data are important to prove the integrity of the acquired data. Oestreicher planned 
to find out whether the same results could be obtained using different models of Mac computers and different OS 
versions. TABLE 5 shows the contributions and limitations of Oestreicher’s research. 
TABLE 5 − Contributions and limitations of Oestreicher’s research 
Contribution Limitation 
Investigated the method of data acquisition on iCloud 
Differences are observed in the MD5 hash values 
collected during experiments. 
Located iCloud-synched files on the OS and the 
differences between the acquisition process files, and the 
integrity of the files acquired as evidence for 
presentation in court was identified. 
The above technique only applies to iCloud storage 
on a secondary Mac OS X 10.9 machine. 
 
Previous studies included a number of limitations. The cloud storage market consists of approximately 2,200 
firms worldwide. Rather than focusing on well-known cloud storage services, such as Amazon, Google Drive, 
Microsoft One Drive, and Dropbox, research should be broadened to newly established cloud storage services to help 
forensic investigators obtain evidence from various cloud services. Different types of cloud storage services have 
different locations for data remnants stored in the computer hard drive after using the client software for cloud 
storage. 
 
Collecting Cybercrime Evidences Scheme (Method) 
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This section aimed to identify and collect possible cyber crime evidence that could be found in the computer cloud 
storage. The method was designed using four components, which included the identification, locating, collection, and 
analysis of evidence, as shown in FIG. 1.  
FIG. 1 − Cybercrime evidence collection methodology 
An evidence identification component identified all the potential evidence of cybercrime. This component 
identified all the changes made during each executed process. The copied VM after each process was compared with 
the base VM to identify the file changes made to the registry and log files in each specific scenario created, for 
example, to identify each VMEM and VDMK files available and the database and logs files of the entire testing. 
Moreover, the relevance of peripheral components to the investigation must be considered. These components 
included the non-computer equipment associated with the targeted computer, such as printers.  
An evidence locating process identified the location of each file change. This process served as a guideline in 
locating potential data remnants being stored. The evidence locating process was carried out by checking each 
potential location where the files reside in that the evidence can be copied and that evidence acquisition can take 
place. Evidence collection happens after the location of the data remnants was found. The images of the computer 
volatile memory (RAM) of each scenario and the VDMK files of each VM scenario were copied. AccessData FTK 
Imager Version 3.4.2.6 was used to obtain evidence. 
The process was followed by the evidence analysis phase to determine what information can be extracted from 
each file. The analysis was conducted to compare the base image files to the subsequent image files copied in each 
scenario. This process determined the changes made. Observing the changes to the registry files and file systems was 
possible. This process recovered the evidence material using different methodologies, such as keyword search across 
the digital media, the recovery of deleted files, and the extraction of registry and log files information, as well as tools, 
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such as the SQLite viewer, HxD, AccessData FTK Imager, AccessData FTK, Wireshark, and Event viewer. FIGURE. 
2 shows the flowchart of the overall process during the experiment.  
Moreover, the flowchart was used to guide the conduct of planned experiment scenarios in order to achieve the 
desired result within a specific time frame. This process also provided an overview on how the experiment was 
conducted to avoid wasting time. Each process used the new VMs, which were copied, deleted, and reinstalled after 
testing to ensure that each scenario was created in a new VM environment and that accurate data were obtained. The 
following scenarios were carried out in the newly created VMs. FIG. 3 shows the usage of VMs when the scenarios 
were carried out. 
The implementation stage required all the details gathered during the methodology design phase. The concluded 
steps were implemented in the real experiment. The experiment was carried out using the two VMs earlier mentioned 
to conclude the result. The two VMs were deployed to two computers for testing. All experiments can be 
implemented within the shortest time possible to avoid resource waste. The specific requirements and design 
specifications were studied briefly to ensure that all the processes can be carried out smoothly. All necessary 
software and hardware devices were prepared before starting the integration and system testing phase to avoid 
unnecessary problems that may disrupt the testing process. 
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FIG. 2 − Flowchart of cybercrime evidence collection 
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FIG. 3 − VM usage when scenarios were carried out 
 
Experiment and Result Discussion 
 
This section discusses the experiment and its results in detail, which include the steps and types of tests carried out. 
This scheme was implemented through the analysis of the web browser pCloud account information, control images 
created for each VMs scenarios, and pCloud client software. Moreover, the uninstallation process of the client 
software, directory listing, prefetch, registry, network PCAP, browser, memory, and link files were also analyzed and 
discussed. 
 
Analysis of Files Created From Scenarios Carried Out and their Location 
 
Each of the forensic image files retrieved from each scenario, as well as the network PCAP and memory dump files 
were copied from the hard drives. All forensic images copied were examined and analyzed using various tools, such 
as AccessData FTK Version 5.5, AccessData FTK Imager Version 3.4.2.6., HxD Version 1.7.7.1, and Wireshark 
network analyzer 2.0.5. The analysis processes were conducted to determine the content of data remnants created and 
left on the PC hard drives. These data remnants help forensic investigators in illustrating client activities and other 
necessary information. 
 
pCloud account information using a web browser 
 
When accessing https://my.pcloud.com/ using different web browsers, the username is displayed at the top right 
corner of the browser. The records of devices, which include mobile and PCs synced with the pCloud account, were 
shown with the number of spaces used and available for the user. Moreover, the details of the files and folders stored 
13 
 
were also written on the homepage of pCloud websites. They include the folder’s last modification date and files size. 
Each file has a file info icon that allows the user to view the metadata of the files. 
The account settings and download links, as well as the linked account settings can be changed at the top right 
corner of the browser. The account settings offer the option to show or hide system hidden files and to reset account 
passwords. Active tokens regarding the devices used to access the accounts and other related information, such as the 
creation and expiration dates, are available. An option to show download links separately along with detailed usage 
stats in download link settings is also available. Moreover, pCloud provides an option for users to back up their 
folders and files to other accounts, such as OneDrive, Facebook, Instagram, Dropbox, and Picasa Web Album 
accounts. 
Accessing pCloud accounts using web browsers allow users to unlock pCloud’s featured client-side encryption 
software, enabling users to manage and to prevent intrusion from unauthorized access and protect sensitive 
information and stored files. Users can have an encrypted folder for sensitive files. The features are available for 
users for $3.99 monthly. However, this special feature makes the process of evidence acquisition highly tedious 
because data can easily be hidden from the view of forensic investigators. 
Accessing a pCloud account using a web browser also allows users to view deleted files in the Trash folder. 
Users can view their deleted files and restore their files when necessary in Trash. Additional information about the 
deleted files is available, such as the date and time the files were deleted. 
The files in pCloud were stored in at least three different servers located in different data centers. This action 
ensures the redundancy of data. Thus, during server failure, users can still obtain their files from other functioning 
servers. pCloud provides offline access to users who do not have active internet connection. The information and 
metadata files in pCloud have their own purposes, which guide forensic investigators in obtaining crucial evidences 
of crimes. 
 
Analysis of pCloud base images created by different browsers 
  
Base images were created before each scenario is set to act as a control. This step ensures that related artifacts and 
files do not exist before each browser is installed and scenarios are carried out. To conduct the analysis, we ran 
keyword searches with the different terms shown in TABLE 6. The analysis indicated that data and artifacts related 
to browsers and pCloud client software files did not exist before each installation. 
 
Analysis of pCloud client software 
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The results of the earlier test show that the pCloud client software was downloaded from www.pcloud.com for 
Windows 7. The downloaded files were stored in the “C:\Users\ [username]\Downloads\” folder with the name 
pCloud_Windows_3.3.1, which shows its software version. After running the program, a window instructed users to 
install Microsoft.NET 4.5.2 to continue the installation process. The same scenario occurred in the four VMs used 
for the installation process of the pCloud client software. After installing Microsoft.NET 4.5.2, the executable file 
pCloud_Windows.exe was copied to the hard drive of the VM created earlier. 
 
TABLE 6 − List of keyword search terms 
Keyword Categories Keyword 
Browser Google, firefox, 
Software pCloud, pcloud.com 
Pictures uploaded Picturetesting1, Picturetesting2, Picturetesting3, Picturetesting4 
PDF uploaded Example_of_An_Expert_Witness_Digital_for.pdf 
Documents INVESTIGATOR.doc 
Password  xcey, testings 
  
The analysis of the four uploaded VMs shows that the pCloud client software was installed in the “C:\Program Files (x86)\” 
folder. The pCloud sample files and folders were observed on the hard drive, specifically at the default pCloud folder located at 
“C:\Users\ [username]\pCloud Drive”. A drive named “pCloud Drive (P:)” appeared under My Computer. The default pCloud 
drive comes with five folders (My Music, My Pictures, My Videos, pCloud Help and pCloud Sync), and the details of each file in 
the folder are summarized in TABLE 7. 
 
TABLE 7 − Summary of default files that comes with the pCloud client software installation 
Folders Name of Files Types of Files 
My Music 
Demo Audio 2 
GotJoy 
Lovely Day 
Momentum 
MP3 format sound 
MP3 format sound 
Wave sound 
MP3 format sound 
My Pictures 
Friends, happy-family, in-the-sky,  
lovers, romance, sweet 
All in JPEG format 
My Videos Pcloud MP4 video 
pCloud help Getting started with pCloud.pdf PDF files 
pCloud Sync No files  
 
The files shown above were analyzed using Access Data FTK Toolkit. This method allows forensic examiners to 
identify the specific files necessary for an investigation process. The timestamps created by the files stated above, 
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such as date created, date modified and date of last access, can help examiners determine when a software was last 
accessed, created in the system or last modified. For example, the last date a file was accessed allows examiners to 
know the files tampered by criminals. After obtaining this information, examiners can create a storyline of how a 
crime occurred and obtain crucial information related to a crime. The pCloud drive will be synchronized with the 
files contained in the hard drives. The synchronization of files in the pCloud Drive with the files in web browsing 
allows examiners to obtain crucial data and important evidences regarding their investigations. 
According to McClain (2011), a Dropbox client software running in a Windows Operating System has a file 
named “filecache.db”, which stores a history of filenames synchronized with Dropbox. These files contain various 
information. However, “data.db” does not exist in the Dropbox client software (version 1.2.52). Instead, a file with a 
DBX extension (filecache.dbx) exists, which is encrypted and cannot be interpreted. Studies that analyzed Google 
Drive also show that “sync_config.db” and “snapshot.db” files exist, which contain the information and downloaded 
and synchronized files, as well as the details of files associated with cloud storage. Thus, the  pCloud analysis shows 
that a “data.db” file exists in the “C:\Users\ [username]\AppData\Local\pCloud” folder. The “data.db” file holds 
numerous information, which includes the local path of the pCloud sync and web browsing information used to 
access pCloud with a number of ports. By determining the location of sync files being stored, examiners can access 
the content stored in a particular pCloud account without logging in as users. 
 
“data.db” files from pCloud also contain information regarding the metadata of the files stored in the cloud 
itself. This information includes the parent folder id, hash value of the files, name of the files, type of files, as well as 
the date of file creation and last modification. Moreover, “data.db” contains crucial information on cloud storage, 
such as the pCloud client software username and the password associated with the account created. These 
information aids examiners during evidence acquisition and retrieval, which are normally tedious. For example, a 
forensic copy of hard drive images obtained from a seized computer hard drive can be run in a related software for 
data retrieval and scanning. However, information of a pCloud user, such as usernames and passwords stored within 
ta hard drive, can be exploited easily by criminals who gain remote access to a victim’s computer. TABLE 8 presents 
a summary of the files found in VM hard drives after the analysis of the pCloud client software. 
 
TABLE 8 − Summary of files found in VMs 
No Files name File Location Description 
1 pCloud_Windows.exe 
“C:\Users\ [username]\Downloads\” 
folder 
pCloud client software installation files 
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Directory Listing of VM hard drives 
 
During testing, a directory listing was produced for each VM created using Access Data FTK Imager Version 3.4.2.6. 
All the filenames can be viewed using this software. Keyword searches were conducted across the forensic image 
files created from each VM to filter out a specific keyword of the files in the hard drive. The analysis of the four base 
VMs created as a control for this test shows that files associated with pCloud sample files, as well as the files stored 
in a pCloud account before the installation of a pCloud client software , did not exist. Moreover, other uploaded .jpg 
files, as well as the pdf and document files synced with the pCloud account, did not exist before the client software 
installation. 
Various subsequent filenames associated with pCloud exist in other created VMs, particularly in Upload-, 
Access-, Uninstall-, Download- Eraser-, and CCleaner-VMs. The files were mostly contained in a folder, such as 
User’s Desktop, Download folders, pCloud Drive (P:\), as well as in the pCloud folder in the hard drive path of 
“C:\Users\ [username]\pCloud Drive”. In upload-VMs, the downloaded installation files “pCloud_Windows_3.3.1” 
existed in the “C:\Users\ [username]\Downloads\” folder. Access-VMs also retained files associated with pCloud in 
“data.db”.  
The timestamps of “data.db” change according to the last time the pCloud client software was ran. Traces of the 
files uploaded to the pCloud in the pCloud Drive appeared, as shown in TABLE 8. These traces existed because the 
uploaded files and pictures via web browsing are synced with the pCloud client software and stored in the pCloud 
Drive (P:\) in the computer hard drive. In Download-VMs, the downloaded files were seen in “C:\Users\ 
[username]\Downloads\” 
The filenames seen after accessing a pCloud account using a web browser were similar with the filenames 
observed when accessing a pCloud account via a client software because the file was synced with the user’s 
computer local folder C:\Users\ [username] \Documents \ pCloud Sync and also pCloud Drive folder “/pCloud Sync”. 
Finally, the analysis of Eraser-VMs and CCleaner VMs showed that the filenames of deleted files completely 
vanished from the pCloud sync folder in the user’s hard drive. However, the downloaded filenames still existed in 
the “C:\Users\ [username]\Downloads\” folder until the files were manually deleted from the folder. The deleted 
2 
pCloud client software 
installed 
“C:\Program Files (x86)\” folder pCloud client software installed 
3 “data.db” 
“C:\Users\ 
[username]\AppData\Local\pCloud” 
Local path of pCloud sync and web 
browsing information used to access 
pCloud with the number of port, 
username, files stored, metadata of the 
files stored in the cloud itself 
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filenames remained in the recycle bin until the user removes them from the recycle bin of the hard drive. Even if the 
files were cleared from the recycle bin, these can still be retrieved using AccessData FTK imager easily. All the 
information found through all the files in a computer hard drive help forensic investigators in data analysis. TABLE 
9 presents a summary of a directory listing in VM hard drives. 
 
TABLE 9 − Summary of directory listing in VMs hard drives 
 
 
 
Link Files of VMs 
 
The analysis of link files showed that filenames with the extension of .link associated with a pCloud sample, files 
such as picturetesting3.lnk and picturetesting2.lnk, were located at 
“C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent Items”   
in all Upload, Download, Eraser, and CCleaner-VMs. However, other link files were not found within the four 
Access-VMs. This result indicated that the link files were only created after the files were downloaded and opened. 
TABLE 10 shows a summary of the link files in the VM hard drives. 
 
TABLE 10 − Summary of the link files in VM hard drives 
No Files Names File Location 
1. 
picturetesting3.lnk 
picturetesting2.lnk 
“C:\Users\ [username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent Items 
 
No VMs File Names Location of the files 
1. upload-VMs pCloud_Windows_3.3.1 C:\Users\ [username]\Downloads\ 
2 Access-VMs 
data.db 
synced files 
Synced files 
C:\Users\ [username]\AppData\Local\pCloud” 
pCloud Drive folder “/pCloud Sync” 
folder  
C:\Users\ [username] \Documents \ pCloud Sync 
3 Download-VMS Downloaded files 
pCloud Drive (P:\) 
C:\Users\ [username]\Downloads\ 
4 
CCleaner-VMs 
 
Deleted files 
(picturetesting1.jpg and 
picturetesting4.jpg) 
C:\Users\ [username]\Downloads\ 
5. Eraser-VMs 
Deleted Files 
(picturetesting1.jpg and 
picturetesting4.jpg) 
C:\Users\ [username]\Downloads\ 
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Prefetch files created on VMs after each running the application 
 
Prefetch files can aid forensic investigators in analyzing the applications running on a system. Prefetch files are 
normally created by Windows when an application is run for the first time from a location to speed up the loading 
time of applications. Thus, these files contained crucial data on the history of a user’s application. For example, 
CCleaner was run before deleting files and uninstalling the pCloud client software from the hard drive. Moreover, 
prefetch files still existed in the system even if the client software was uninstalled. Prefetch files were located at 
“C:\Windows\Prefetch”. The prefetch files were viewed using WinPrefetchView v1.35. 
 
Analysis of event logs files 
 
In the current study, event logs were viewed and analyzed by using the built-in Windows event viewer. All the files 
shown in the event viewer were viewed for all the events that occurred in the VMs throughout the testing time frame. 
A rule was added to the Windows Firewall exception list when the pCloud client software was installed. Moreover, 
another rule called “Windows Communication Foundation Net.TCP Listener Adapter (TCP-In)” was also added to 
the Windows Firewall exception list after the installation of the Microsoft.NET, which was compulsory to install the 
pCloud client software. Each software installation process was stored when log files “Microsoft-Windows-Windows 
Firewall With Advanced Security%4Firewall.evtx” existed in the “%SystemRoot%\system32\winevt\logs” folder. 
 
Analysis of VM cache files 
 
During the test, the VMware used the stored information regarding guest applications in a directory called caches 
under the directory where the .vmdk file of each VMs resided. By analyzing the cache directory, a forensic examiner 
may recover important information, such as the names of files and shortcuts present in a user’s desktop, the 
timestamps of a shortcut being created, its icon, and the timestamps of the application ran for the first time. The 
ubiquity of virtualization presented ample opportunities for examiners to find useful artifacts in the cache directory 
of a user’s hard drive. Users basically install VMware Tools before the desktop is made available to them for the first 
time. During the installation of VMware Tools, <VMHome>\caches were created on the host.  
PC\Documents\VirtualMachines\caches\<VMHome>\Caches\GuestAppsCache\appdata contains 171 files, 
which are individually named with a long hex value and the extension .appicon or .appinfo. The file contains the path 
to the pCloud client application and additional information. Opening the sister file 
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7e93b9a9e3360c8dc1663ff72f094bab.appinfo in a hex editor shows the installation process of the pCloud client 
software into the hard drive. This result indicated that a user installed the pCloud software before, and important 
evidences may be located in a pCloud account. When a user opens an application within the context of a guest VM, 
there was no change to either of the .appinfo or .appicon pair of files, and the contents of 
<VMHome>\caches\GuestAppsCache were untouched. The content of the files remained as long as the VM was still 
used. TABLE 11 presents a summary of VM cache files in the VM hard drives. 
 
TABLE 11 − Summary of VM cache files in VMs 
 
 
RAM Analysis 
 
In the current study, VMEM files from the memory were collected in each scenario before the VMs were shut down 
using AccessData FTK Imager. The analysis of each VMEM files collected from each scenario showed that the term 
“pCloud” was seen in the VMEM files collected in all scenarios except the Base-VMs. The website URL 
(www.pcloud.com) was located in all other VMEM files except the Base-VMs.  
pCloud account information, such as usernames, was found in the Upload-, Access-, and Download-VMs. 
Usernames were often found around several texts, which include “>=r....[username]”,“5username[username]” and 
also &username=[username]. The passwords of a pCloud account were clearly shown in plaintext around the text 
“&password=[password] and “*eà [password]”. This text can help forensic investigators in running keyword 
searches to identify the potential pCloud account information of a criminal. Furthermore, data carving was retrieved 
in thumbnail pictures, as well as partial picture files, recovered from the pCloud sample files in the VMEM files for 
access, upload, and Download-VMs. 
 
Thumbcache files 
 
Thumbcache files are databases that store thumbnail images of various contents on a system. These databases 
mentioned are native to Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1 and Windows 10 systems. For 
No Files Name Location of the files 
1. Installation files of VMs <VMHome>\caches 
2. .appicon or .appinfo files 
ThisPC\Documents\VirtualMachines\caches\<VMHome>\Caches\GuestApp
sCache\appdata 
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example, a thumbnail preview of an image is generated when a mouse is hovered over an image in a folder. The 
presence of pictures in a Windows thumbnail database is considered an indicator of guilt because a folder containing 
the pictures must have been opened and viewed through Windows Explorer in a thumbnail; thus, a thumbnail 
database existed. This existence implied that the user accessed the specific files. In the current study, the analysis of 
thumbcache files for the four Base-VMs was conducted, and the result showed that pCloud sample pictures did not 
exist before the pCloud client software was installed and accessed. Moreover, the stored pCloud sample pictures 
were not found in the Access- or CCleaner-VMs. However, thumbnail samples regarding of the stored pCloud 
sample files were found in the other VMs, including Upload-, Download-, and Eraser-VMs. Hence, thumbnail 
images were only stored in the thumbcache files after certain files were downloaded, accessed, or uploaded into an 
account. 
 
Network PCAP files 
 
In the current study, PCAP files were created using Wireshark and Network Miner 2.0 during the live network 
capture when pCloud was accessed using different browsers. PCAP files were created to help forensic investigators 
analyze data network and packet sniffing characteristics. Examining network capture files aids examiners extract 
information regarding network activities, as well as file remnants associated with pCloud activities. Network traffic 
was basically observed using Port 80, which was http, and then Port 443, which was https. The analysis showed that 
when a pCloud account was accessed by either using a client software or a web browser; the analysis showed that a 
session with IP ranging from 74.120.8.0 to 74.120.8.255 was registered under pCloud.com from Fort Lauderdale, 
Florida, in the United States. Another session with IP ranging from 54.192.72.0 to 54.192.72.255 was found on Port 
80 then to Port 443, which was registered for cloudfront.net located at Woodbridge, New Jersey, United States. 
Sessions with IP 216.58.221.0- 216.58.221.225 were registered under www.google-anaytics.com from source port 
TCP 443. TABLE 12 presents a summary of the observed IP lists and their organization from the PCAP file captures. 
 
TABLE 12 − Summary of observed IP lists and their organization from the PCAP files captured 
IP Address Registered Organization 
74.120.8.0-74.120.8.255 
216.58.0.0-216.58.0.255 
54.192.72.0-54.192.72.255 
74.125.68.0-74.125.68.255 
74.125.200.0-74.125.200.255 
54.84.248.0-54.84.248.255 
54.210.220.0-54.210.220.255 
My.pCloud.com 
Google Service 
Cloudfront.net 
Stats.doubleclick.net 
www.google.com 
Amazon Web Service 
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Anti-forensic Technique and uninstallation of a pCloud client software 
 
During testing, CCleaner and Eraser were both ran within the computer hard drive to delete the downloaded files 
from a pCloud account and to uninstall the pCloud client software. However, several data remnants associated with 
pCloud, such as pCLoud sync files, pCloud cache files and web- browsing history, were still found within the hard 
drives although the client software was uninstalled. This result indicated that applying anti-forensic toolkits, such as 
CCleaner and Eraser, cannot completely remove all the traces of the files associated with pCloud. This information 
can be helpful for forensic investigators to acquire evidences from a user’s hard drives. 
Thus, the analysis of the data and file remnants shows that only the files installed within the “C:\Program Files 
(x86)\” folder and pCloud sample files and folders existed in the hard drive. However, the pCloud folder located at 
“C:\Users\ [username]\pCloud Drive” was deleted. The pCloud Sync folder located at “C:\Users\ [username] 
\Documents \ pCloud Sync” can still be found in the computer hard drive. All the client software caches and “data.db” 
that contain the most crucial information regarding the account information still existed in the “C:\Users\ 
[username]\AppData\Local\pCloud” folder. This outcome showed that numerous file remnants were unaffected after 
uninstalling the pCloud client software. TABLE 13 shows the summary of files found in the VM hard drives after the 
uninstallation of the pCloud client software and the files associated with it. 
 
TABLE 13 − Summary of the files found in VM hard drives after the uninstallation of pCloud client software and the 
files associated with it 
No Name of files Location of files 
1 pCloud sample files deleted C:\Program Files (x86)\ 
2 pCloud sync folder C:\Users\ [username] \Documents \ pCloud Sync 
3 data.db C:\Users\ [username]\AppData\Local\pCloud folder. 
 
Presentation of Evidences 
 
A number of data remnant types were found in the hard drives of the VMs after users accessed, downloaded or stored 
files in the pCloud account. All the obtained evidences aided forensic investigators during case investigations. The 
current study enables forensic investigators to find a specific file location, which is the source of all the evidences 
needed in the investigation. By determining the location of evidences, forensic investigators can retrieve the 
evidences, thereby reducing the time needed to solve a case. 
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Thus, the analysis of the pCloud client software indicates that information, such as pCloud usernames, 
passwords, sessionsID, network traffic, prefetch file listing, link files and browsing history, were proven as definitive 
clues to identify the content of the files that may be crucial to solve a case. The analysis of volatile data was proven 
effective and conclusive in determining pCloud account access, as well as the networking devices used to connect to 
the pCloud account, because the devices used to access and synchronize with the pCloud account were shown when 
a client accessed the account via browsers. This finding is important because each device synchronized with the 
pCloud account will potentially contain evidences associated with cases investigated. A summary of the analysis 
results is shown TABLE 14. The tests and implementation processes in finding the location and the data remnants on 
a user’s computer prior to the usage of a cloud storage application for a new cloud storage were conducted 
successfully. Quick and Choo (7), who used Dropbox as their case study, did not include the information regarding 
the analysis of VM Cache files, which was proven beneficial in obtaining information regarding the history of files 
previously ran on a user’s computer.  
 
TABLE 14 − Summary of the analysis findings 
Type of 
VMs 
Data Remnant Found 
Password Username Software Sample files 
Keyword 
search term 
Base VMs Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 
Upload-
VMs 
Found in 
RAM 
Found in 
RAM 
PCloud_Windows.e
xe was found after 
being downloaded. 
The location of 
client software 
installation and the 
pCloud sample files 
uploaded were 
found. 
Files were found in prefetch 
files and link files, among 
others. 
Multiple 
matches of 
keyword 
search 
obtained 
Access-
VMs 
Found in 
RAM 
Found in 
RAM 
Nil 
The information of pCloud 
software accessed was found 
residing in cookie, browsing 
history, pagefiles, and 
unallocated spaces. 
Multiple 
matches of 
keyword 
search 
obtained 
Download-
VMs 
Found in 
RAM 
Found in 
RAM 
Nil 
The downloaded files were 
stored in the VM hard 
drives. 
Multiple 
matches of 
keyword 
search 
obtained 
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Comparison of the Results Taken From Previous Research 
 
Moreover, the directory listing of pCloud showed that synced files identical to the files found in pCloud accounts 
existed, which helped forensic investigators obtain evidences offline. The analysis of a client software in the present 
study showed that more information can be found in the “data.db” files created by pCloud than that in the 
“filecache.dbx” or “host.db” files created by Dropbox. The files “data.db” from pCLoud contained information 
regarding the local path of pCloud sync and web browsing information used to access pCloud with the number of 
ports used to access it. However, “filecache.db” and “host.db” only contained information regarding a history of 
filenames synchronized with Dropbox. 
 
Conclusion and Future Works 
With the advancement of the technology era, cloud computing or cloud storage services are gaining acceptance and 
popularity because of the convenience of using these technologies However, cloud technology poses challenges for 
forensic practitioners who deal with cybercrimes. Cybercrimes are broad in scope and are defined as attacks that 
involve the use of computers or networks to commit crimes (3). Data can be uploaded and accessed from different 
devices without retaining traceable evidences. Thus, determining the types of cloud service providers used by 
criminals and the user details necessary is crucial for investigations. This information will help forensic investigators 
identify the location of crucial data and extract and preserve these data in a forensically sound manner. By using 
pCloud as a case study, we found that the potential data remnant on a Windows 7 computer can be retrieved from the 
browser history when web access was conducted using different browsers. Client software files, prefetching files, 
link files, network traffic capture, and memory captures were identified successfully based from the usage of pCloud 
Eraser-VMs 
 
Nil Nil Nil 
The information of pCloud 
software accessed were 
found residing in cookie, 
browsing history, pagefiles, 
and unallocated spaces. The 
deleted files were still found 
in unallocated spaces. 
Multiple 
matches of 
keyword 
search 
obtained 
CCleaner-
VMs 
Nil Nil Nil 
The information of pCloud 
software accessed were 
found residing in cookie, 
browsing history, pagefiles, 
and unallocated spaces. The 
deleted files were still found 
in unallocated spaces. 
Multiple 
matches of 
keyword 
search 
obtained 
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for each user activity. Future research may employ experiments regarding mobile devices and examine other newly 
developed cloud storage services using the same methodology as that in the current study. 
Future work of this study will be conducted further by focusing on implementation. An experiment will be 
conducted to test and evaluate the efficiency of the proposed scheme in locating and collecting artifacts and evidence 
on cloud computing. 
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